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Abstract
Open proxies forward trac on behalf of any Internet user.
Listed on open proxy aggregator sites, they are often used to
bypass geographic region restrictions or circumvent censor-
ship. Open proxies sometimes also provide a weak form of
anonymity by concealing the requestor’s IP address.
To better understand their behavior and performance, we
conducted a comprehensive study of open proxies, encompass-
ing more than 107,000 listed open proxies and 13M proxy re-
quests over a 50 day period. While previous studies have
focused on malicious open proxies’ manipulation of HTML
content to insert/modify ads, we provide a more broad study
that examines the availability, success rates, diversity, and also
(mis)behavior of proxies.
Our results show that listed open proxies suer poor
availability—more than 92% of open proxies that appear on ag-
gregator sites are unresponsive to proxy requests. Much more
troubling, we nd numerous examples of malicious open prox-
ies in which HTML content is manipulated to mine cryptocur-
rency (that is, cryptojacking). We additionally detect TLS man-
in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, and discover numerous instances
in which binaries fetched through proxies were modied to in-
clude remote access trojans and other forms of malware. As
a point of comparison, we conduct and discuss a similar mea-
surement study of the behavior of Tor exit relays. We nd no
instances in which Tor relays performed TLS MitM or manipu-
lated content, suggesting that Tor oers a far more reliable and
safe form of proxied communication.
1 Introduction
Open proxy servers are unrestricted proxies that allow access
from any Internet user. Open proxies are fairly prevalent on the
Internet, and several websites are devoted to maintaining large
lists of available open proxies. In contrast to VPNs [29] and
some (but not all) anonymity systems, open proxies are gener-
ally easy for users to use, requiring only minimal conguration
changes (e.g., adjusting “network settings”) rather than the in-
stallation of new software.
As surveyed in this paper, there is a variety of types of open
proxies, with diering capabilities. This leads to variation in
how proxies are used in practice. Clearly, open proxies have
∗Co-rst authors.
†Co-rst authors.
been (mis)used for malicious purposes, including (but not lim-
ited to) sending spam, injecting ads, and serving as stepping
stones for various attacks [38, 46]. But open proxies have also
been used for far less nefarious reasons, including circumvent-
ing censorship eorts. More generally, they permit accessing
otherwise inaccessible information and, controversially, can be
used to bypass regional content lters (e.g., to watch a sporting
event that, due to licensing restrictions, would otherwise not
be viewable). Importantly, along with VPNs, proxies have been
suggested as a means of enhancing Internet privacy and pro-
tecting browsing history in the face of the recent expansion of
data collection rights by U.S. Internet service providers [30].
An interesting related question, and one that unfortunately
has not undergone rigorous study, is why the owners of open
proxy servers run such services. In some instances, the proxies
are due to misconguration or even compromise. There is a
rich history of accidental open proxies, particularly for open
proxies that operate as SMTP relays [43]. Still, many proxies
are operated by choice. Although the rationales here are not
well-understood, we posit that some operators may run proxies
as a political statement about privacy and the freedom to access
information.
A more menacing motivation for running a proxy is that it
provides its operator with an expanded view of network trac.
Proxy operators are well situated to eavesdrop on communica-
tion, perform man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, and monitize
their service by injecting spurious ads [46]. We note that while
it is relatively dicult to operate a backbone Internet router
and monitor trac, it is not dicult to act as an open proxy
and increase one’s view of others’ communication.
We are of course not the rst to suggest that open proxies
should be treated with a healthy supply of skepticism, due in
large part to the ease in which proxies can be instantiated and
congured to eavesdrop and manipulate communication. Most
noteworthy is the recent study of open proxies by Tsirantonakis
et al. [46]. There, the authors explore the extent to which open
proxies modify proxied HTML pages to inject ads, collect user
information, and redirect users to malware-containing pages.
Similar to Tsirantonakis et al.’s study, we also consider the mod-
ication of retrieved webpages. This paper compliments their
work by conducting a large and more broad study of the Inter-
net’s open proxies.
We perform an extensive study of the open proxy ecosys-
tem, consisting of more than 107,000 publicly listed open prox-
ies. We nd that the vast majority (92%) of open proxies that
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are publicly listed on aggregator websites are either unavailable
or otherwise do not allow proxy trac. Surprisingly, the open
proxies that do allow proxy trac have very little geographic or
network diversity: ve countries account for nearly 60% of the
Internet’s working open proxies, and 41% of such proxies are
hosted by just ten autonomous systems (ASes). We also evalu-
ate the performance of the proxies, and nd a wide distribution
of eective goodputs.
To understand the security implications of relaying trac
through open proxies, we present a series of experiments de-
signed to understand a broad range of proxy behaviors. We
compare the results of trac received via direct communica-
tion with trac that traverses through proxies. While our re-
sults indicate that the majority of open proxies seemingly op-
erate correctly (that is, they forward the trac unimpeded), we
nd a surprisingly large number of instances of misbehavior.
In particular, as we discuss in more detail in what follows, we
discover many instances in which proxies manipulate HTML
content, not only to insert ads, but also to mine cryptocurrency
(i.e., cryptojacking). Our study also discloses numerous attacks
in which proxies return trojan Windows executables and re-
mote access trojans (RATs), and conduct TLS MitM attacks.
As a point of comparison, we compare the level of manip-
ulation observed using open proxies to that when content is
fetched over Tor [23]. Over the course of our nearly month-
long experiment in which we fetched les from every available
Tor exit relay, we found no instances in which the requested
content was manipulated. Our results suggest that Tor oers a
more reliable and trustworthy form of proxied communication.
In summary, this paper describes a large-scale and broad
study of the Internet’s open proxies that (i) examines the
open proxy ecosystem, (ii) measures open proxy performance,
(iii) measures the prevelance of previously undisclosed attacks,
and (iv) relates its ndings to a similar study (which we con-
duct) of Tor exit relay behavior. Our results demonstrate that
misbehavior abounds on the Internet’s open proxies and that
the use of such proxies carries substantial risk.
2 Background
The Socket Secure (SOCKS) protocol [34] was introduced in
1992 as a means to ease the conguration of network re-
walls [33]. In SOCKS, a server listens for incoming TCP con-
nections from a client. Once connected, a client can then tun-
nel TCP and/or UDP trac through the SOCKS proxy to its
chosen destination(s). Since SOCKS forwards arbitrary TCP
and UDP trac, clients can use end-to-end (e2e) security pro-
tocols (in particular, TLS/SSL) through SOCKS proxies. Cur-
rently, SOCKSv4 and SOCKSv5 servers are both deployed on
the Internet, with the latter adding authentication features that
enforce access control. In this paper, we do not distinguish
between SOCKSv4 and SOCKSv5, and use the general term
SOCKS proxies to describe proxies running either version.
More commonly (see §5.1), open proxies use HTTP as a
transport mechanism. This has the benet of supporting clients
whose local rewall policies prohibit non-HTTP trac (e.g., as
is sometimes the case on corporate networks).1
We distinguish between two types of proxies that rely on
HTTP. The rst, which we refer to simply as HTTP proxies,
allows clients to specify a fully-qualied URL—with any domain
name—as part of a HTTP GET request to the proxy. The proxy
parses the GET URL and if the requested URL is on a dierent
host, the proxy makes its own request to fetch the URL and for-
wards the response back to the client. Conceptually, a HTTP
proxy is a web server that serves pages that are hosted else-
where.
A signicant disadvantage of HTTP proxies is that it is in-
compatible with e2e security protocols such as TLS, since it is
the HTTP proxy (not the user’s browser) that initiates the con-
nection to the proxied URL. The inability to support fetching
HTTPS URLs increasingly limits the use of HTTP proxies due
to the growing adoption rate of HTTPS [28] on the web.
In contrast, CONNECT proxies use the HTTP CONNECT
method [32] to establish e2e tunnels between the client (i.e., the
browser) and the destination webserver. CONNECT proxies al-
low the client to specify a host and port. The proxy then initi-
ates a TCP connection to the specied target and then transpar-
ently forwards all future TCP data from the client to the des-
tination, and vice versa. Importantly, CONNECT proxies for-
ward trac at the TCP level (layer 4) and are not limited to any
particular application-layer protocol. CONNECT proxies sup-
port TLS/HTTPS connections since the browser can eectively
communicate unencumbered to the destination webserver and
perform an ordinary TLS handshake. Example protocol inter-
actions for HTTP and CONNECT proxies are provided in Fig-
ures 14 and 15 in Appendix A.
The network addresses (IPs and ports) of open proxies are
listed on proxy aggregator sites. These sites also some-
times use the term transparent, meaning that the proxy sup-
ports at least e2e TCP tunneling; SOCKS and CONNECT prox-
ies meet this criterion. As another dimension, aggregator sites
also sometimes categorize proxies as anonymous proxies. These
proxies purportedly do not reveal the client’s IP address to the
destination. We explore the degree to which open proxies pro-
vide anonymity in §5.1.
3 Related Work
We are not the rst to investigate the use of proxies on the Inter-
net. Weaver et al. [52] performed a measurement study to detect
the presence of transparent HTTP proxies on connections from
clients to servers. They found that 14% of tested connections
were proxied somewhere along the network path between the
client and destination. Our work focuses on the intentional use
of freely available proxies and gathers evidence of misbehavior
by such proxies.
Scott et al. [40] provide insights about the use, distribution,
and trac characteristics of open proxies on the Internet. How-
1Although, as we report in §5.1, most proxies that use HTTP as a transport
mechanism do not listen on ports 80 or 443, potentially nullifying this advantage.
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ever, they do not focus on detecting any malicious behavior by
open proxies, which is a core focus of this work.
Other work has investigated the misuse of proxy servers. Of
note, Jessen et al. [41] deploy low-interaction honeypots to ex-
plore the (ab)use of open proxies to send spam. Researchers
have also examined the abuse of the Codeen CDN network [50]
by looking at the requests that were forwarded by the network
and mitigation strategies employed to minimize the forwarding
of malicious requests [38, 51]. While we also investigate mis-
behavior, we focus on uncovering malicious behavior by open
proxies rather than malicious use of proxies by users.
Tyson et al. [47] study HTTP header manipulation on the
Internet by various open proxies and discuss various observed
factors aecting HTTP header manipulation. Huang et al. [31]
show that ASes sometimes use middleboxes that interfere with
HTTP trac and inject HTTP headers across a wide range
of networks including mobile and data centers. Durumeric et
al. [26] examine the degree of HTTPS interception by middle-
boxes and argue that such interception signicantly reduces se-
curity. Our work has greater scope, and focuses not only on
header manipulation or HTTPS interception, but also uncovers
several other forms of suspicious behavior exhibited by open
proxies. Waked et al. [49] show that commercially used TLS
middleboxes do not perform sucient validation checks on SSL
certicates and expose their clients to trivial attacks. We also
found that some open proxies exhibit similar behavior.
Previous work has also looked at ad injection in HTML con-
tent [21, 39, 44]. Similarly, we look at content manipulation by
open proxies, but consider other forms of misbehavior beyond
ad injection.
Most related to this work is the recent study by Tsirantonakis
et al. [46] that also looks at content manipulation by examining
roughly 66K open HTTP proxies on the Internet. Their work
provides an in-depth analysis of dierent types of malicious be-
havior exhibited by proxies by injecting Javascript code. Their
analysis shows that proxies inject Javascript aimed at track-
ing users, stealing user information, ngerprinting browsers,
and replacing ads. Complementary to their work, we provide
an in-breadth analysis of 107K unique open proxies by eval-
uating their availability, performance, and behavior across a
large spectrum of potential attacks. We look at manipulation
of content by open proxies, not only through the injection of
Javascript, but also by modication of dierent types of re-
quested content (binary les, etc.) and through TLS MitM. Ad-
ditionally, unlike existing work, we evaluate the behavior of
open proxies based on dierent client locations. Laudably, Tsir-
antonakis et al. [46] built a service to detect malicious open
proxies on a daily basis and to publicly report the proxies
deemed unsafe. We compare our ndings using this service. As
an alternative to open proxies, we compare the performance of
open proxies to Tor exit relays (§9), and argue that Tor provides
a safer means of proxied communication.
Proxy Aggregator Proxies
clarketm [5] 6,343
multiproxy.org (all) [9] 1,524
multiproxy.org (anon) [10] 373
NordVPN [11] 29,194
ProxyBroker [22] 73,905
workingproxies.org [15] 1,250
xroxy [16] 345
Total (unique proxies) 107,034
Table 1: Sources of open proxies. A given proxy may be listed by more
than one aggregator.
4 Methodology & Experimental Setup
Our study of the Internet’s open proxy servers has two main
goals: (i) to measure the proxies’ availability, composition, and
performance and (ii) to assess the degree to which proxies ex-
hibit malicious behavior. We begin by describing the method-
ology used to perform our study.
We conducted our study over a 50 day period, beginning on
2018-04-12 and ending on 2018-05-31. Our measurement ap-
paratus, described next, was installed on 16 locations (listed in
Table 8 in Appendix B); these included 15 geographically di-
verse AWS regions and an installation at our local institution.
We term each instance a client location. Having multiple client
locations allows us to determine whether proxies behave dier-
ently based on the network and/or geographic locations of the
requesting client.
From each client location, an automated process performed
the following steps once per day:
1. Populate: We collect and combine lists of advertised
proxies from a number of proxy aggregator sites. We aug-
ment this list with the results of running ProxyBroker [22],
an open source tool for nding open proxies. In all cases,
proxies were listed by aggregator sites as tuples contain-
ing an IPv4 address and a TCP port number. The complete
list of sources of proxies is listed in Table 1. We emphasize
that the list of proxies is (re)fetched daily since, as we show
in §5.1, open proxies are subject to high levels of churn.
2. Classify: Next, from each client location, we attempt
to connect to each proxy and, if successful, determine
whether the proxy is a HTTP, CONNECT, or SOCKS
proxy.
3. Fetch: Finally, we request several les (URLs) from the
set of proxies that we were successfully able to classify.
In more detail, during the Fetch step, we retrieve the follow-
ing les from each proxy that we were able to classify, using
unencrypted HTTP connections: an HTML page, a Flash object
(.swf), a Windows executable (.exe), a JPEG image, a ZIP le, a
Windows batch (.bat) le, a Linux/UNIX shell script (.sh), and a
Java JAR archive. With the exception of the .exe le (explained
in more detail in §7), the URLs are hosted on web servers at our
institution.
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For CONNECT and SOCKS proxies (i.e., the proxies that sup-
port TLS), we also request les over HTTPS from a properly
congured (i.e., with a valid certicate) web server running
at our institution. We additionally request HTML les from
https://revoked.badssl.com/ and https://self-signed.badssl.com/
which, respectively, use revoked and self-signed certicates.
The rationale for fetching content from sites with invalid cer-
ticates is discussed in §8. In all cases, we set the User-Agent
HTTP request header to match that of Google Chrome version
62.0.3202.94 running on Mac OS X.
For each proxy request, we record whether the request com-
pleted. If we received a response from the proxy, we also record
the HTTP status code and response string (e.g., “200 OK”) re-
turned by the proxy, the size of the response, the content of
the response, the MIME-type of the response (as determined
by lemagic), the time-to-last-byte (TTLB) for receiving the re-
sponse, the HTTP response headers, and (in the case of HTTPS
requests) the certicate received.
Throughout the remainder of this paper, we use the term ex-
pected content to refer to the correct contents of the le and
unexpected content to refer to content returned by a proxy
that does not match the le indicated by the requested URL.
A correctly functioning open proxy should thus return the ex-
pected content. As we explore in more detail below, unexpected
content does not necessarily indicate malicious behavior. For
instance, unexpected content could be an HTML page indicat-
ing that the proxy is miscongured or that the proxy requires
user authentication.
We remark that a weakness of our study, and one that
we share with studies that examine similar (mis)behavior in
anonymity and proxy services [20, 46, 54], is that we cannot
easily dierentiate between manipulation that occurs at a proxy
and manipulation that occurs somewhere along the path be-
tween the proxy and the destination. Our ndings of misbe-
havior can be viewed as indications that a proxy should not be
used, either because it was itself malicious or because its net-
work location makes trac routed through it routinely vulner-
able.
5 Proxy Availability & Performance
The number of unique proxies listed by proxy aggregator sites,
over time, is shown in Figure 1. The median number of proxies
listed on the aggregator sites over all days in the measurement
period is 41,520, with a range of [38,843; 48,296]. In total, dur-
ing the course of our study, we indexed approximately 107,000
unique proxies that were listed on aggregator sites.
We nd that more than 92% of open proxies that are
advertised on proxy aggregator sites are oline or oth-
erwise unavailable. Figure 2 plots the number of responsive
proxies over time for which we were able to establish at least
one connection and retrieve content. We remark that the Fig-
ure includes proxies that returned unexpected content. Across
our measurement study, the median daily number of responsive
proxies is 3,283; the medians for HTTP, CONNECT, and SOCKS
proxies are 1,613; 1,525; and 74, respectively.
We use the MaxMind GeoLite2 City and ASN databases [36]
to resolve each proxy’s IP address to a physical location and
an autonomous system (AS). Tables 2 and 4 respectively re-
port the most frequent locations and ASes from among the
proxies that are listed, responsive (i.e., respond to proxy re-
quests), and successfully deliver the expected content at least
once. There is surprisingly little geographic and network
diversity among the proxies. Ten countries are responsible
for nearly three-quarters of the world’s working proxies, while
Brazil alone is home to nearly 20% of the proxies that forward
expected content.
Similarly, a handful of ASes are privy to trac from a dis-
proportionate amount of the open proxies. In particular, U.S.-
based DigitalOcean and the Chinese No. 31 Jin-rong Street AS
each host approximately 7% of the working proxies. In general,
the distribution of open proxies on the Internet is very skewed,
with roughly 40% of proxies conned to only 10 ASes. More-
over, open proxies are found on only a small fraction of the
Internet: although more than 31,000 proxies accepted proxy re-
quests during the course of our experiment, they resided on just
2,971 (5.8%) of the Internet’s approximately 51,500 autonomous
systems [4].
We identied Squid, an open-source cacheing proxy, as the
most frequent proxy software among the relays that (i) re-
sponded to our client requests and (ii) inserted a self-identifying
Via or X-Via HTTP header. As shown in Table 3, Squid
was used by over 85% of such proxies. Overall, we identied
130 dierent self-reported proxy software systems, although we
note that not all proxies include Via or X-ViaHTTP headers
(84.43% do not) and that such headers are easily forged and may
not actually reect the actual software.
As reported in Figure 4, approximately 62% of working prox-
ies listened on TCP ports 8080, 3128, or 20183. Port 8080 is
an alternative port frequently used for web trac or cacheing
servers, and 3128 is the default port used by Squid. The popu-
larity of port 20183 is surprising; it is not listed as a standard
port by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). The
standard web port, port 80, is used by 7% of open proxies. The
frequent use of ports 8080 and 3128 by open proxies provides
a potential means of discovering additional potential proxies:
Censys, which is based on ZMap [25] Internet scans, reports
7.3M Internet hosts listening on port 8080; Shodan lists 1.1M
hosts with services listening on port 3128 [12]. As we discuss in
§10, we limit our study to only the proxies whose addresses are
listed publicly by aggregator sites, and thus for ethical reasons
do not probe these additional 8.4M hosts to discover unlisted
proxies.
5.1 Performance
We evaluate the performance of proxies by considering good-
put, computed as the size of a fetched le (we use a 1MiB le)
divided by the time taken to download it through a proxy. We
consider only instances in which the response reects the ex-
pected content (i.e., the 1MiB le). Figure 5 shows the range
of proxies’ daily average goodput for requests that yielded
the expected content. Overall, the average goodput for such
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on aggregator sites, over time.
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Figure 2: Working proxies, by type, over time.
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Figure 3: Total fetches and fetches with ex-
pected and unexpected content, by client lo-
cation.
Listed Responsive Correct
Country Percent Country Percent Country Percent
China 18.81% Brazil 17.97% Brazil 19.48%
Brazil 15.55% China 16.75% China 14.74%
United States 15.19% United States 12.12% United States 12.17%
Indonesia 5.95% Indonesia 6.77% Indonesia 7.15%
Thailand 5.14% Thailand 5.73% Thailand 6.06%
Russian Federation 4.60% Russian Federation 5.11% Russian Federation 5.40%
Germany 2.53% Singapore 2.61% Singapore 2.78%
Singapore 2.34% Germany 2.59% India 2.52%
India 2.21% India 2.54% Germany 2.44%
Italy 1.79% Canada 1.93% Canada 1.91%
All others (count: 145) 25.69% All others (count: 136) 25.65% All others (count: 131) 25.17%
Table 2: Locations of proxies listed on aggregator sites (left), capable of accepting proxy connections (center),
and forwarding correct content at least once (right).
Software Percent
squid 87.07%
http_scan_by 2.89%
1.1 www.santillana.com.mx 2.29%
1.0 PCDN 1.78%
HTTP/1.1 sophos.http.proxy:3128 1.74%
swproxy 0.57%
Cdn Cache Server 0.40%
MusicEdgeServer 0.34%
1.1 Pxanony 0.22%
1.1 j5k-8 (jaguar/3.0-11) 0.21%
All others (count: 120) 2.50%
Table 3: Proxy software.
proxies is 128.5KiBps, with an interquartile range (IQR) of
[39.5; 160.9] KiBps.
We also consider proxies’ utility over time. A proxy that of-
fers high goodput but functions only sporadically is not par-
ticularly useful. We dene the success rate to be the fraction
of proxy requests that were successfully completed and yielded
the expected content. Figure 6 plots proxies’ success rates as a
function of their average goodput. We note that, generally, the
proxies that oer the highest goodput (highlighted in the Figure
with the oval) also tend to oer the highest success rates. The
existence of stratied “lines” when the success rate is 1/3, 1/2,
and 2/3 is somewhat surprising: this indicates a regular peri-
odicity or schedule during which these proxies are available.
5.2 Expected vs. Unexpected Content
Proxies do not always return the expected content. However,
not all unexpected content is malicious. For example, many
tested proxies return a login page or a page conveying an au-
thentication error, regardless of the requested URL. These indi-
cate that the listed open proxy is either miscongured, actually
a private proxy, or is some other miscongured service. Here,
we answer the question: to what extent do listed open proxies
return the expected content?
For our analysis, we consider the proxies that have responded
to at least one proxy request with a non-zero byte response
and a 2xx HTTP response code that indicates success (i.e., in
[200, 299]). For each such proxy, we determine its failure rate,
which we dene as 1 − success rate. That is, a proxy’s failure
rate is the fraction of returned responses that constitute unex-
pected content.
Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution (y-axis) of these
proxies’ failure rates (x-axis). Of proxies that respond to proxy
requests with 2xx HTTP success codes, we nd that 92.0%
consistently deliver the expected content. Alarmingly, ap-
proximately 8% of the proxies at least sometimes pro-
vided unexpected content, and 3.6% of the proxies con-
sistently returned unexpected content—all with HTTP re-
sponse codes that indicate success. In §6 and §7, we explore
cases in which the content has been purposefully and mali-
ciously manipulated—for example, to return a trojan .exe le
or to insert spurious ads in retrieved HTML content. Further,
as shown in Figure 3, the behavior of proxies—that is, whether
they returned expected or unexpected content—does not signif-
icantly vary with the location of the requesting client.
5.3 Anonymity
Open proxies are sometimes used as a simple method of hiding
a user’s IP address. We nd that such a strategy is mostly inef-
fective, with nearly two-thirds of tested proxies exposing
the requestor’s IP address.
In more detail, we inspect the HTTP request headers that are
sent by a proxy to the destination webserver. These include
the headers added by our client toolchain (specically: User-
Agent and Accept) and those inserted by the proxy. To ac-
complish this, we constructed and hosted a simple web appli-
cation that records HTTP request headers. We then examined
the request headers that were produced when we used a client
at our local institution to access our web application through
each proxy. Of the proxies that were able to connect to our
web application (13,740), we found that 66.08% (9,079) inserted
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Listed Responsive Correct
ASN Name Percent ASN Name Percent ASN Name Percent
4134 No.31,Jin-rong Street 9.34% 14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 7.81% 14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 7.47%
14061 DigitalOcean, LLC 6.69% 4134 No.31,Jin-rong Street 7.73% 4134 No.31,Jin-rong Street 6.65%
18881 TELEFÃŤNICA BRASIL S.A 3.55% 18881 TELEFÃŤNICA BRASIL S.A 4.10% 18881 TELEFÃŤNICA BRASIL S.A 4.52%
4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 2.51% 17974 PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia 2.63% 17974 PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia 2.77%
17974 PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia 2.26% 4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 2.53% 4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone 2.40%
13335 Cloudare Inc 1.81% 45758 Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband 1.97% 45758 Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband 2.10%
16276 OVH SAS 1.73% 20473 Choopa, LLC 1.66% 20473 Choopa, LLC 1.82%
45758 Triple T Internet/Triple T Broadband 1.73% 53246 Cyber Info Provedor de Acesso LTDA ME 1.62% 53246 Cyber Info Provedor de Acesso LTDA ME 1.79%
20473 Choopa, LLC 1.44% 16276 OVH SAS 1.52% 16276 OVH SAS 1.56%
53246 Cyber Info Provedor de Acesso LTDA ME 1.38% 31034 Aruba S.p.A. 1.33% 31034 Aruba S.p.A. 1.45%
— All others (count: 3419) 64.27% — All others (count: 2961) 61.17% — All others (count: 2759) 59.06%
Table 4: Most popular ASNs for proxies listed on aggregator sites (left), proxies capable of accepting connections (center), and proxies that
forwarded correct content at least once (right).
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Figure 5: Proxy goodput (log-scale). Box plots depict the range
of proxies’ average goodput over its daily requests. The box de-
picts the IQR with the median; the whiskers denote 1.5 × IQR.
Points beyond the whiskers are outliers.
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goodput (log-scale). The highlighted oval
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of the proxies’ failure rate (i.e., the
fraction of responses that constituted unexpected content).
at least one header (most commonly, X-Forwarded-For)
that contained the IP address of our client.
6 HTML Manipulation
We begin our study of malicious behavior among open prox-
ies by considering the manipulation of fetched HTML content.
In the absence of end-to-end SSL/TLS (i.e., the use of HTTPS),
a malicious proxy can trivially either modify the web server’s
response or respond with arbitrary content of its choosing.
To detect such misbehavior, we fetch an HTML page via the
open proxies each day between 2018-05-04 and 2018-05-31. For
simplicity, we focus on the HTML pages fetched through the
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Figure 8: Classication of modied HTML retrieved on 2018-05-07.
client at our local institution. We observe a median of 1,133
successful requests (i.e., completed requests with 2xx HTTP
response code) per day.
Overall, we nd that 10.5% of requests for HTML pages
produced unexpected HTML content.
As noted above, not all unexpected content necessarily cor-
responds to malicious behavior. Since the observed fraction of
unexpected HTML content is almost the same for each day of
our measurement study, we perform an in-depth analysis for a
random day, 2018-05-07, to determine whether the HTML ma-
nipulation could be categorized as malicious. On that date, we
observe requests through 1,259 proxies, of which 169 (about
13.4%) return unexpected HTML content. (We discard requests
that did not yield 2xx success HTTP response codes.)
We manually analyze these 169 modied HTML les. Our
methodology is as follows. First, we inspect each le and di-
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vide them into two categories: benign (non-malicious) les and
suspicious les. The latter category represents HTML les that
contain Javascript code (either directly in the le or through the
inclusion of an external Javascript le).
We then collectively inspect each of these benign and suspi-
cious les and classify them into ve benign classes and four
non-benign classes. This inspection process involves manually
examining the les, rendering them in a browser on a virtual
machine, and potentially visiting Javascript URLs that were in-
serted. The ve classes that we posit do not indicate malicious-
ness are as follows:
• Equivalent: the fetched HTML renders equivalently
in a web browser to the expected content. Oddly,
we found instances in which HTML tag attributes
were inconsequentially reordered; for instance, tags
such as <IMG SRC="A" ALT="B"> are rewritten as
<IMG ALT="B" SRC="A">.
• Misconguration: the retrieved content constituted error
pages, often displaying “not accessible” messages.
• No Content: the page contained no content.
• Truncated: the retrieved page was a truncated version of
the expected content.
• Unauthorized: the pages showed error messages such as
“invalid user” or “access denied”.
The identied classes of proxy misbehavior are:
• Ad Injection: the proxy replaced HTML content with
Javascript that rendered extraneous advertisements.
• Original + Ad Injection: the returned HTML contained the
expected content, but also included a single ad injection.
• Cryptojacking: the returned HTML include Javascript code
that would cause the user’s browser to mine cryptocurren-
cies on behalf of the proxy.
• Potential Eavesdropping: the retrieved page contained
Javascript that caused the user’s browser to visit pages
from its history, potentially revealing these pages to the
proxy if they were previously visited without the use of
the proxy.
The classications of the modied HTML les with their
counts and percentages are shown in Figure 8. We were un-
able to classify six HTML responses, described in the Figure as
“Unlabeled”.
Overall, we nd that approximately 80% of the unexpected
HTML responses are benign. Approximately 72% of the pages
contained errors, likely due to private access proxies or due to
miscongured proxy software.
Wend that 16.6% of unexpectedHTML responses (and
2.2% of overall proxy requests for HTML content) corre-
spond to malicious activity, including ad injection, cryp-
tojacking, and eavesdropping. Among the malicious activ-
ity, most prominent (13%) is ad injection.
Perhaps most interestingly, we nd that about 3% of the
les include Javascript that performs cryptojacking—that is,
the unauthorized use of the proxy user’s processor to mine
cryptocurrencies in the background. Upon further inspection,
<script src="https://www.hashing.win/scripts/min.js">
</script>
<script>
var miner = new Client.Anonymous(
’ ’,
{ throttle: 0.1 }
);
miner.start();
</script>
Figure 9: Injected HTML code with link to remote cryptojacking
Javascript. The user identier has been redacted.
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Figure 10: Per day total requests (top), unexpected responses and ma-
licious responses (middle), and percentage of malicious responses rela-
tive to total responses (bottom).
we determined that each such instance uses the same injected
Javascript code, shown in Figure 9.
The referenced min.js script is obfuscated Javascript. Af-
ter decoding it, we determined that it is similar to Coinhive’s [6]
Monero2 cryptocurrency [8] mining Javascript. The 64 charac-
ter long argument to the Client constructor serves as the identi-
er for the user to be paid in the original Coinhive setting. (We
redact this argument in Figure 9 because it potentially identies
a criminal actor.) Finally, we note that all Coinhive endpoints
described in the copied Coinhive script are replaced with other
domains, indicating that whoever is running the infrastructure
to collect the mining results is not using Coinhive’s service.
7 File Manipulation
Over the duration of our 50 day experiment, we made more
than 4.8M successful requests through 21,385 proxies to fetch
a variety of non-HTML les (specically, Windows .exe, Java
.jar, Flash, .zip, and Windows .bat les). As before, we dene a
successful request to be one in which the proxy returns a 2xx
HTTP response code and a non-zero content size. Furthermore,
we exclude HTML, plaintext, and PHP responses (as determined
2Monero is advertised as a “secure, private, and untraceable” cryptocur-
rency [8].
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Requested
File Type
Return File Type (VirusTotal)
EXE Flash JAR ZIP HTML ISO GZIP XML Unknown
EXE 6614/6713 - - - 410/423 - 0/39 0/34 12/234
Flash - 0/1546 - - 352/362 - 0/3 0/34 0/32
JAR - - 0/1075 2/400 338/351 - 0/2 0/34 0/55
ZIP - - - 12/4162 380/395 - 0/18 0/34 0/176
TEXT - - - - 436/446 545/545 0/2 0/34 23/10910
BAT - - - - 556/574 - 0/98 0/34 2/719
Table 5: Requested le types and various response le types determined by VirusTotal for unexpected responses. Each entry for a given request
and response le type shows the fraction of malicious responses.
No. of antivirus
systems agging
as malicious
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 18
No. of Files 19,802 587 1,274 1,508 4,232 1,513 23 545
(67.16%) (1.99%) (4.32%) (5.11%) (14.35%) (5.13%) (0.08%) (1.85%)
Table 6: The number of les and percentage (relative to all unexpected content les) (bottom row) agged as malicious by varying number of
antivirus systems (top row) used by VirusTotal.
by lemagic) from our analysis to avoid uninteresting instances
of error pages or unauthorized access pages (see §6).
Figure 10 (top) shows the frequency of total successful re-
quests made per day, averaging approximately 97K requests
per day throughout the measurement period. Overall, 29,484
(0.61%) of such requests (made by 6.76% of the proxies), consti-
tute unexpected content.
To check whether unexpected content is malicious, we sub-
mitted all 29,484 unexpected responses to VirusTotal [14] for
scanning. VirusTotal scans uploaded les using multiple an-
tivirus tools and returns detailed analysis results, including the
uploaded les determined le types. Table 5 provides a sum-
mary of our ndings. Each entry for a given request and re-
sponse type (determined by VirusTotal) indicates the fraction
of responses with unexpected content that were agged as ma-
licious by VirusTotal. Note that VirusTotal (correctly) deter-
mined various responses to be HTML that were wrongly clas-
sied as non-HTML by lemagic in our initial pass of ltering
out HTML pages.
To establish a baseline, we veried that all of the expected
responses are not classied by VirusTotal as being malicious.
That is, no single antivirus tool used by VirusTool marks the
expected content as being malicious, as expected.
On the contrary, VirusTotal ags 32.84% (9,682/29,484) of the
unexpected responses as malicious; that is, at least one of the
antivirus systems used by VirusTotal ags the content as ma-
licious. Figure 10 (middle) shows the number of unexpected
and malicious responses per day. The percentage of malicious
responses (relative to total success successful fetches per day)
remained fairly consistent throughout our study (Figure 10 (bot-
tom)). Across our experiment period, we nd that, on av-
erage, 0.2% of daily proxy responses are classied asmali-
cious by at least one antivirus system used by VirusTotal.
Table 6 shows the number of unexpected responses that are
agged as malicious, broken down by the number of antivirus
tools used by VirusTotal that classied it as malicious. At the
extreme, for example, we nd 545 retrieved les that are con-
sidered malicious by 18 dierent antivirus systems.
7.1 Detailed Findings
In what follows, we discuss in more detail our ndings of mali-
cious proxy activity, organized by le type.
Windows Executables (.exe). Almost all (98.5%) of unex-
pected responses for .exe les are classied as malicious. We
nd that 1.93% (413/21,385) of the proxies maliciously
modied the .exe le at least once during our measure-
ment period. The infections include malware from the Expiro
malware family that can be used to steal personal information
and provide remote access to the attacker [2], and avors of
malware from the Crypt and Artemis trojan families [1, 3]. Ta-
ble 9 in Appendix C lists the top 10 reported infections for .exe
les.
Flash and .jar Files. VirusTotal did not ag any of the mod-
ied Flash or Java .jar les as malicious. We are unsure of
whether this indicates (i) benign (but unexplained) instances
in which proxies rewrite these les, or (ii) a limitation of the
scanners used by VirusTotal.
ZIP Files. For ZIP le responses with unexpected con-
tent, only a single antivirus system (McAfee-GW-Edition,
v2017.2786) agged 0.28% (14/4562) of them as malicious. Virus-
Total did not provide any details about the infection.
HTML Files. We received HTML responses from proxies (as
determined by VirusTotal) irrespective of the requested content
type. Roughly 0.2% (44/21,385) of the proxies returned unex-
pected content at least once, with 43 of them returning mali-
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No. Malicious Proxies AS Number AS Name
72 4134 No.31,Jin-rong Street
45 14061 DigitalOcean, LLC
25 4837 CHINA UNICOM China169 Backbone
14 17974 PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia
9 56046 China Mobile communications corporation
Table 7: The ve ASes with the most number of malicious proxies.
cious content as well. Almost 97% (2,472/2,551) of these HTML
responses were labeled as malicious. Table 10 in Appendix C
shows the reported infections and the number of HTML re-
sponses with malicious code. Upon further manual examina-
tion, we found that all of the 2,472 malicious responses detected
by VirusTotal contain the same Monero cryptocurrency [8]
mining Javascript shown in Figure 9.
ISO Files. Surprisingly, on 545 occasions, we received ISO
les when requesting a 1MiB text le. All of the 545 ISO re-
sponses were exactly 1MiB in size, but were agged as mali-
cious by VirusTotal. Table 11 in Appendix C shows the var-
ious infections reported by VirusTotal. We note that all 545
les were infected with the Vittalia Trojan, a rootkit for Win-
dows. The content of 520 of the 545 ISO images was identi-
cal while the remaining 25 responses were identical to one an-
other. Although the ISO les were clearly malicious, only 0.04%
(9/21,385) of the proxies returned a malicious ISO response at
least once.
Shell Scripts. We fetched shell scripts to determine if ma-
licious proxies would modify (or replace) the scripts in transit.
We nd that 22.75% (211,288/928,431) of the requests for shell
scripts result in responses with unexpected content. To hone-
in on malicious activity, we discarded responses whose MIME-
type was not “text/x-shellscript”; we found 1,020 instances in
which the responses were unexpected but were determined to
be shell scripts. Oddly, all 1,020 instances of unexpected con-
tent correspond to just four unique responses, summarized in
Table 12 in Appendix C. All of these modications appear to be
non-malicious (strangely, one frequent modication inserts the
text “Pop HerePop HerePop HerePop HerePop HerePop Here-
Pop HerePop Here” and little else) and are most likely due to
misconguration. Overall, we did not nd any evidence of ma-
licious shell script manipulation during our measurements.
7.2 Network Diversity and Consistency of Mali-
cious Proxies
For the responses that we deemed malicious, we also looked
at the distribution of responsible proxies. Table 7 shows the
top ve ASes with the most number of proxies that performed
malicious manipulations.
We also looked at the daily behavior of the top three ma-
licious proxies over the duration of our measurement, as de-
termined by the number of malicious responses returned. The
most malicious proxy returned malicious content 100% of the
time. The second and third most malicious proxies returned
malicious responses 97.7% and 87.9% of the time, respectively,
when they were reachable. This trend is apparent in Figure 11,
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Figure 11: Consistency of malicious proxy behavior.
which plots (in log-scale) the cumulative distribution of the
number of times that malicious proxies (dened as a proxy that
ever behaves maliciously) exhibit misbehavior. Here, we see
that half of proxies that return malicious content do so at least
twice. More than 25% of malicious proxies return at least 10 les
with malicious content, while the top 10% of malicious proxies
return 56 or more malicious les.
Surprisingly, none of the 469 discovered proxies that return
malicious content (§7.1) are listed on the service run by Tsir-
antonakis et al. [46] that reports misbehaving proxies. This
suggests that correctly identifying misbehaving proxies is very
challenging, since proxy misbehavior may be transient and may
take dierent forms.
8 SSL/TLS Analysis
We nd that 70% (14,607/20,893) of the proxies that fetch ex-
pected content at least once allow TLS trac to pass through
them. We emphasize that supporting HTTPS incurs no over-
head on behalf of the proxy, since the proxy is not involved in
the (end-to-end) cryptography and is merely transporting the
ciphertext. It is worth noting that as of early June 2018, more
than 70% of loaded web pages were retrieved using HTTPS [35].
The lack of universal HTTPS support among the open proxies
eectively forces some users to downgrade their security, buck-
ing the trend of moving towards a more secure web.
We consider misbehavior among two dimensions: attempts
at decreasing the security of the communication through TLS
MitM or downgrade attacks, and alteration of the content.
SSL/TLS Stripping. We rst examine whether any of the
proxies rewrite HTML <A> link tags to downgrade the trans-
port from HTTPS to HTTP. For example, a malicious proxy
could attempt to increase its ability to eavesdrop and mod-
ify unencrypted communication by replacing all links to https:
//example.com with http://example.com on all webpages re-
trieved over HTTP. To perform this test, we fetched via each
proxy a HTML page hosted on a web server at our institution
over HTTP. This HTML page contained six HTTPS links. We
did not nd evidence of proxies stripping SSL by replacing the
included links.
SSL Certicate Manipulation. In this experiment, we
search for instances of SSL/TLS certicate manipulation. While
interfering with an HTTPS connection would cause browser
warning messages, numerous studies have shown that even
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Figure 12: Percentage of proxies that return expected content but per-
form TLS/SSL MitM, for websites that use revoked (top), self-signed
(middle), and valid and unexpired certicates (bottom).
security-conscious users regularly ignore such warnings [17,
42].
We test the proxies against two categories of domains: one
with a valid and veriable SSL certicate hosted on a web
server at our institution; and domains with incorrect or invalid
SSL certicates (https://revoked.badssl.com, https://self-signed.
badssl.com/). We include the latter category since we posit that
a smart attacker might perform SSL MitM only in instances
in which the connection would otherwise use revoked or self-
signed certicates; in such cases, the browser would issue a
warning even in the absence of the proxy’s manipulation.
To detect SSL/TLS certicate manipulation, we fetch the
three domains (listed above) via the open proxies each day be-
tween 2018-04-12 and 2018-05-31. For simplicity, we focus on
the pages fetched through the client at our local institution.
Overall, we nd that 1.06% (102/9,625) of proxies that
support HTTPS perform TLS/SSL MitM by inserting a
modied certicate. To determine whether any of the proxies
performing SSL/TLS MitM might belong to a known botnet, we
searched the SSL Fingerprint Blacklist and Dyre SSL Fingerprint
Blacklist [13] for the modied certicates’ ngerprints. We did
not nd any blacklisted certicates.
We next consider proxies that fetch the expected content but
modify the SSL/TLS certicate. Such behavior suggests that the
proxy is eavesdropping on HTTPS connections. The percent-
age of such eavesdropping proxies, per day, for the dierent
categories of certicates is plotted in Figure 12. Overall, 0.85%
(82/9,607) of the proxies that return expected responses appear
to be eavesdropping. We did not nd any evidence of proxies
selectively targeting incorrect or invalid SSL certicates.
Finally, we analyze the modied TLS certicates inserted by
the eavesdropping proxies when the requested site is https:
//revoked.badssl.com or https://self-signed.badssl.com/ (i.e.,
when the genuine certicate is revoked or self-signed, respec-
tively). We nd that there were 435 modied certicates from
21 unique issuers. The issuer common name (CN) strongly sug-
gests that 19% (4/21) of the issuers were schools. We posit that
the proxies that modied these certicates were operated by
schools and were incorrectly congured to serve requests from
any network location. Interestingly, all of the certicates in-
serted by these school proxies had the expected subject com-
mon name and were valid (but not normally veriable, since
the school is not a root CA). This leads to an interesting result:
if the schools pre-installed root CA certicates on students’ or
employees’ computers, then they are signicantly degrading
the security of their users. That is, they are masking the fact
that requested webpages have expired or revoked certicates
by replacing these invalid certicates with ones that would be
veried. This is similar to the eects observed by Durumeric
et al. [26] in their examination of enterprise middleware boxes,
which also degraded security by replacing invalid certicates
with valid ones signed by the enterprise’s CA.
Performing TLS MitM also allows a malicious proxy to mod-
ify page content. To detect such behavior, using the same ap-
proach as described in §6, we analyzed HTML pages fetched
over TLS via the open proxies. We did not nd any malicious
activity.
9 Comparison With Tor
Tor [23] provides anonymous TCP communication by routing
user trac through multiple relays (typically three) using lay-
ered encryption. The rst relay in the path (or circuit) is the
guard relay, and the nal relay through which trac exits is
the exit relay. The original data transmitted is visible only
at the exit relays. Therefore, unless e2e encryption is used,
data can be eavesdropped by malicious or compromised exits.
Prior research studies have found evidence of malicious behav-
ior such as interception of credentials, etc., by a small fraction
of Tor exit relays, especially when the trac was not e2e en-
crypted [20, 37, 54]. We now compare the level of manipulation
as observed using open proxies to that when content is fetched
over Tor.
We modify Exitmap [54], a fast scanner that fetches les
through all Tor exit relays. To maintain consistency with
our earlier experiments, we fetched the same set of les (e.g.,
HTML, .exe, etc.) as described in §6 and §7 over HTTP, and ac-
cessed the same HTTPS URLs as described in §8. We fetched
these les each day through every available Tor exit relay be-
tween 2018-05-06 and 2018-05-31, during which the median
number of available exit relays was 722.
Approximately 13.8% of connections and 1.8% of fetches
timed out when using Exitmap. This is unsurprising since Ex-
itmap does not perform the same (and necessary) bandwidth-
weighted relay selection as the standard Tor client [23, 54].
Over our 26 day Tor experiment, we found no instance in
which a Tor exit relay manipulated either le contents
or SSL/TLS certicates. Comparing our results to §6-8, this
strongly suggests that Tor is a more trustworthy network for re-
trieving forwarded content. However, since Tor exits may still
passively eavesdrop (which we would not detect), we concur
with the conventional wisdom that e2e encryption (i.e., HTTPS)
is appropriate when using Tor.
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Figure 13: Tor vs. open proxy median throughput per day while fetch-
ing a static le of size 1 MiB.
We also compare the performance of Tor to that of the open
proxies. We compute the open proxies throughput as described
in §5.1. For Tor, we rely on data from the Tor Metrics Portal [45];
specically, we use the median time taken per day to download
a static le of size 1 MiB and derive Tor’s median throughput
between 2018-05-06 and 2018-05-31. Figure 13 shows the Tor
and open proxies’ median throughput per day. We nd that
the Tor median throughput is roughly twice the open proxy
throughput. This suggests that Tor performs relatively faster
than the open proxies.
10 Ethical considerations
We designed and conducted our measurements to minimize
risk. In particular, we believe our study’s design and implemen-
tation meet the criteria described in the Menlo Report [24], an
ethical framework for conducting network measurements that
has been widely adopted by the networking and computer secu-
rity communities. The Menlo Report describes four principles
of ethical research.
We achieve the principle of Respect for Persons by avoiding
the collection of data belonging to individual users. In our ex-
periments, we use open proxies largely as they are intended:
we issue standard well-formed proxy requests and request only
benign (non-malicious) trac from non-controversial websites.
We record only our own trac, and in no instance do we mon-
itor or capture the behavior of other proxy users. We do not
attempt to discover non-publicly listed proxies by scanning the
Internet. By focusing exclusively on proxies that are already
publicly listed, we do not risk disclosing the existence of any
previously unknown proxy.
We achieve Benecience by minimizing potential harms while
providing societal benets (i.e., exposing the dangers of using
open proxies). Unlike other studies that explicitly probe for in-
stances of Internet censorship by requesting potentially objec-
tionable content [18, 19, 48, 53], our measurements avoid ex-
posing proxy operators to risk (e.g., government sanction) by
retrieving only URLs that are very unlikely to be censored. Nor
do our measurements consume signicant resources: we re-
quest a small handful of URLs from each proxy; the average
size of the content is just 177 KiB.
Our study meets the Menlo Report’s Justice criterion by dis-
tributing our measurements equally across all identied open
proxies.
Finally, we achieve the Respect for Law and Public Interest cri-
terion by (i) conducting only legal queries (i.e., we are not re-
questing any content that is likely to be illegal or censored) and
(ii) being transparent in our methods (see §4).
11 Conclusion
Open proxies provide a free and simple way to bypass regional
content lters and achieve a limited degree of anonymity. How-
ever, the absence of any security guarantees for trac passing
through these proxies makes their use highly risky: users may
unintentionally expose their trac to malicious manipulations,
especially when no end-to-end security mechanisms (e.g., TLS)
are present.
Our study of the Internet’s open proxies—the largest con-
ducted to date—discloses and quanties new forms of mis-
behavior, reinforcing the notion that open proxies should be
used with extreme caution. We found numerous instances
of misbehavior, including the insertion of spurious ads and
cryptocurrency-mining Javascript, TLS MitM, and the injection
of RATs and other forms of malware. Moreover, we found that
92% of advertised proxies listed on open proxy aggregator sites
are nonfunctional. In contrast, our nearly monthlong study of
the Tor network found zero instances of misbehavior and far
greater stability and goodput, indicating that Tor oers a safer
and more reliable form of proxied communication.
While we remain wary about the use of open proxies, some
of the risks we identify can be at least partially mitigated. Tools
such as HTTPS Everywhere [7] can help reduce the risk of traf-
c manipulation by forcing end-to-end protections. The con-
tinued rollout of certicate transparency and similar measures
will also likely reduce (but not eliminate) risk, as they thwart
the certicate manipulation attacks described above.
We emphasize, however, that where e2e integrity and au-
thenticity guarantees are not possible (e.g., for unencrypted
web trac), the use of open proxies still carries substantial risk.
Given users’ diculty in adhering to safe browsing habits even
in the absence of proxies [17, 27, 42], we are hesitant to recom-
mend relying on browser-based protections to defend against
malicious proxy behavior. Our ndings suggest that the risks
of using open proxies are plentiful, and likely far outweigh their
benets.
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A Examples of HTTP Proxy Protocols
Example protocol interactions for HTTP and CONNECT prox-
ies are shown in Figures 14 and 15, respectively.
GET http://neverssl.com/index.html HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Chrome/62.0.3202.94
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 30 May 2018 14:28:02 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 12345
Figure 14: Example HTTP requests (in blue) and HTTP responses (in
red) for HTTP proxies.
CONNECT www.acsac.org:443 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.acsac.org:443
Connection: keep-alive
User-Agent: Chrome/62.0.3202.94
HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established
Connection: close
Figure 15: Example HTTP requests (in blue) and HTTP responses (in
red) for CONNECT proxies.
B Client locations
Location Downtime
California —
Canada —
Frankfurt 1 day
Ireland —
London —
Mumbai —
Paris —
Ohio —
Oregon —
São Paulo —
Seoul —
Singapore —
Sydney —
Tokyo —
Virginia —
Author(s)’ Institution (blinded for review) 3 days
Count: 16
Table 8: Locations of clients and the number of days during the mea-
surement period in which that client did not participate.
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C File Manipulation Infections
Infection Frequency
W32/Behav-Heuristic-CorruptFile-EP 72.2% (4781/6614)
W32.FamVT.ExpiroPC.PE 63.7% (4218/6614)
Heur.Corrupt.PE 56.0% (3704/6614)
malicious_condence_100% (D) 31.9% (2111/6614)
static engine - malicious 26.8% (1777/6614)
Suspicious_GEN.F47V0511 23.2% (1535/6614)
BehavesLike.Win32.Generic 18.1% (1200/6614)
malicious_condence_90% (D) 9.5% (632/6614)
Trojan.Crypt9 7.6% (503/6614)
Artemis 3.08% (204/6614)
Table 9: Top 10 infections reported by VirusTotal for Windows exe-
cutable response le type with unexpected content.
Infection No. of Infected Files
HTML/ScrInject.B 2471
JS:Miner-Q 2415
Trojan.Script 2283
Trojan.ScrInject!8.A 1158
Table 10: Infections reported by VirusTotal for HTML response le type
with unexpected content.
Infection No. of Infected Files
Application.Bundler.iStartSurf 545
HEUR/AGEN.1004062 545
Riskware.Win32.StartSurf.evlkna 545
SoftwareBundler:Win32/Prepscram 545
Trojan.Vittalia.13684 545
W32/StartSurf.AU.gen!Eldorado 545
Win32:Evo-gen 545
heuristic 545
malware 545
not-a-virus:HEUR:AdWare.Win32.Generic 545
Application.Bundler.iStartSurf.DO 545
Application.Bundler.iStartSurf.DO (B) 545
Packed-UT!5694618272F0 520
Packed-UT!4809C4235C2C 25
Table 11: Infections reported by VirusTotal for ISO response le type
with unexpected content.
Unique Files Modication Count
1 OC + HTTP Headers + Truncated OC 1
2 OC + 0 and Newline Character 713
3 OC + </body></html> 8
4 OC + 9 lines of harmless HTML 298
Total 1020
Table 12: Unique responses for modied shell script. OC = Original
Content
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